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Roadblocks to Interactive Digital Adoption? Elite Perspectives of Party Practices in the UK 
Introduction 
Digital technology has become a mainstay of party politics in most Western democracies. While just 
two decades ago party websites were a political novelty, now digital tools have become an 
indispensable component of party life. In addition to the electoral databases, email lists and 
membership management systems that parties have long maintained, new functions and capacities are 
being realized in the digital environment. Social media accounts, the sharing of information, and the 
mobilization of activists and supporters are increasingly taking place online. These innovations have 
led to significant speculation and debate within academia about the capacities and potential of digital 
technology to facilitate more interactive, participatory µHTXDOL]HG¶ interactions between citizens and 
parties (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016; Landemore, 2014; Margolis et al., 2003: Margolis and 
Resnick, 2000: 2; Strandberg, 2008). In existing studies, most established parties (as opposed to new, 
insurgent organisations (Bennett, Segerberg and Knüpfer, 2017)) have not been found to exhibit more 
interactive practices (Gibson and Ward, 2002; Gibson, Römmele and Ward, 2004) as parties have 
µQRUPDOL]HG¶WKHLUDGRSWLRQSUDFWLFHVXVLQJWHFKQRORJ\WRIDFLOLWDWHH[LVWLQJDFWLYLWLHVDQGLGHDVKoc-
Michalska et al, 2014). And yet, more recently, there have been indications from scholarship on party 
organisation, particularly from Gibson (2015) and Chadwick and Stromer-Galley (2016), that the 
internet is empowering citizens to engage with parties in new ways. These perspectives suggest a need 
to revisit this debate to examine whether party elites are embracing interactivity and what explains 
current practices.   
In contrast to previous research that has coded party outputs to determine levels of interaction, this 
article explores SDUW\RIILFLDOV¶ views of digital adoption. Conducting case study analysis of the UK 
Labour and Green parties, interviews are used to examine attitudes and practices in two different areas 
of party activity: electoral campaigning and internal governance. While there is little evidence of elite 
interest in the interactive potential of digital tools in the former, there is more evidence of interest in 
the latter area, even though barriers exist that frustrate the enactment of these ideas. Exploring the 
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significance of partLHV¶REMHFWLYHVDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDOWUDLWVWKLVDUWLFOHH[amines explanations for these 
outcomes and, in so doing, helps scholars and practitioners alike to understand, identify and tackle 
barriers to the adoption of interactive digital tools by party elites.  
Literature Review 
Political parties are no strangers to the use of digital technology. Whilst today such terms evoke 
images of slick websites, targeted Facebook advertising and political canvassing apps, for many years 
technology has played a role in the way parties organize, campaign and reach out to voters and 
supporters. Recently, however, WKHVFRSHDQGLQIOXHQFHRIGLJLWDORQSDUWLHV¶RSHUDWLRQVKDVLQWHQVLILHG
in an apparently exponential manner. In addition to the creation of (numerous) accounts on Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube and Instagram, parties have developed sophisticated websites and blogs, have 
overhauled their internal software, brought consultants in and purchased new programs such as 
NationBuilder (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016: 285).  
These innovations are significant because of the widely cited capacity for technology to change the 
nature of the interaction between parties and the public. Digital tools can facilitate not simply the top-
down communication or broadcast of information from party elites to citizens, but more engaged, 
interactive connections (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016: 285). Whilst the precise meaning of 
interaction is contested (Bucy, 2004; Stromer-Galley, 2004), for many, digital technology enables 
reciprocal connections between users and elites (Hacker and Todino, 1996), providing the former with 
increased control (Jensen, 1998). This type of interaction is held to be normatively desirable (c.f. 
Bucy, 2004) and favoured by citizens (Miller, 2016: 28; see also Nesta, 2010).  
Attempts to understand and classify interaction have come in many forms (Baxter, Marcella and 
Varfis, 2011; Foot, Schneider and Dougherty, 2006; Lilleker and Jackson, 2010). Differentiating 
between studies of digital interaction, Stromer-*DOOH\ KDV GHVFULEHG VWXGLHV RI µLQWHUDFWLYLW\ DV
SURFHVV¶ DQG µLQWHUDFWLYLW\ DV SURGXFW¶ 4: 392). The former examines the nature of interaction 
observed using digital, considering, for example, who is talking, what they are talking about and 
whether relations between µVHQGHUV¶DQGµUHFHLYHUV¶are reciprocal. The latter focuses on the extent to 
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which opportunities for interaction are provided via technology, considering the quality and 
prevalence of these tools. This study lies in the second tradition, considering the extent to which 
parties provide opportunities for the public, party members and/or supporters to engage in two-way 
exchanges in which they experience greater levels of control (as opposed to receiving instruction or 
information).  
Adopting this lens, it appears that elite focused studies have hitherto found scant evidence of 
opportunities for increased interaction in established parties (Gibson and Ward, 2002; Gibson, 
Römmele and Ward, 2004). 0LFKDHO-HQVHQ¶VVWXG\RIVRFLDOPHGLDKDV therefore shown that whilst 
most political campaigns have embraced aspects of interactive architecture on Twitter, these actions 
remain marginal and often concentrated among smaller parties (2016: 24). As such parties are not 
enacting the opportunity to invite persons to communicate and participate in campaigns on their own 
terms, but are rather focusing on engaging in dialogue, or retransmitting communications produced by 
supporters. Similarly, Stromer-Galley argues that parties¶ use of online campaign tools has shown 
SROLWLFDO FDQGLGDWHV WR EH µXVLQJ WKHLU ZHEVLWHV LQ ZD\V VLPLODU WR WKHLU WHOHYLVLRQ RU UDGLR
advertisements²as one-ZD\ PHVVDJHV¶ not realising the two-way potential of digital tools (2000: 
116), findings replicated by Gibson and Ward (2002; see also: Baxter, Marcella and Varfis, 2011: 473; 
Lee, 2015; Lilleker and Jackson, 2010; Norris, 2001). Elsewhere, Kreiss has shown that whilst digital 
media lower the costs to supporters and members of getting involved in party activity or expressing 
political views, WKHVHWRROVKDYHQRWPDGHµcampaigns more responsive to their mobilized supporters 
outside of the JHQHUDOO\ VKDUHG HQGV RI JHWWLQJ D FDQGLGDWH HOHFWHG¶ : 124). Where exceptions 
have been found, these have UHYHDOHG SDUWLHV¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR RIIHU RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR HQJDJH VPDOO
communities. In the UK, for example, Lilleker and Jackson uncovered parties¶ willingness to allow 
members to generate their own content on devoted party websites: LibDemAct, MyConservatives and 
/DERXU¶V 0HPEHUVQHW (2010: 85). Evidence of a move towards interaction has therefore proved 
difficult to find, supporting the normalization thesis. 
More recent studies of party campaigning and organisation have, however, indicated that new 
practices may be emerging. Gibson (2015), in particular, has highlighted the emergence of µcitizen 
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initiated campaigning¶ to argue that more interactive practices are in evidence. For Chadwick and 
Stromer-*DOOH\ WKLV WUHQGKDV WKHSRWHQWLDO WR UHGHILQHSDUW\ DFWLYLWLHVZLWK FLWL]HQV µEUHDWKLQJQHZ
life into the party form, remaking parties in their RZQ FKDQJHG SDUWLFLSDWRU\ LPDJH¶ XVLQJ GLJLWDO
means (2016: 285). Different kinds of engagement between parties, activists and citizens are therefore 
emerging, but whilst it appears that digital tools are being embraced by party strategists (Lilleker, 
Tenscher and âWČWND, 2015: 762), it is not yet clear whether elites are seeking to adopt more interactive 
ideals by engaging citizens in two-way exchanges and providing greater levels of user-led control. 
Neither is it clear what affects elite receptivity to, and implementation of, such ideas.  
In exploring these latter questions, existing theory on party organisation and digital adoption helps 
guide expectations by signalling important differences between parties. Perhaps most influentially, 
Römmele (2003) has DUJXHG WKDW SDUWLHV¶ SUDFWLFHV YDU\ LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKHLU primary goals. 
Distinguishing between vote-maximizing parties and parties concerned with intraparty democracy, 
Römmele argued that the former would µbe concerned with top-down information; broadcasting via 
QHZ ,&7V¶, whereas WKH ODWWHU ZRXOG µstress the participatory aspect of the new communication 
WHFKQRORJ\¶ (12 ± 13). This suggests WKDW SDUWLHV¶ UHFHSWLYLW\ WR LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLOO GLIIHU DFFRUGLQJ WR
their primary objective. 
A second set of explanations can also be identified within and beyond scholarship on digital adoption 
that suggest the relevance of organisational traits. Existing studies have shown evidence of variation in 
the adoption of digital tools despite the presence of similar organisational goals. In the UK, Lilleker 
and Jackson (2010) have therefore shown that whilst the Labour Party¶V ZHEVLWH ZDV XVHG DV D
promotional tool, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats provided information and opportunities to 
connect with one another and the party, revealing differences despite apparently common vote-
maximising aims (88). These findings suggest that Römmele¶V WKHRU\ LV DW OHDVW PHGLDWHG E\
additional factors.  
From one perspective existing work has suggested that party structure is significant. As Gibson has 
argued (2015), the internet can be used to enable more democratic modes of organization or facilitate 
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WKHµPLFUR-management of voters and centralized control by techno-OLWHUDWHHOLWHV¶193). The appeal 
of these strategies is likely to vary in accordance with the degree to which central elites wish to retain 
control. Whilst a highly decentralised party may be open to more interactive tools, a centralised party 
is likely to exhibit what Bennett et al GHVFULEH DV D µWRS-down or centre-RXW¶ IRUP RI OLQNDJH WKDW
µincreasingly detaches citizen engagement from core organizational processes, except through 
communication-based appeals during elections¶ : 3-4). Overlapping with Römmele¶V WKHVLV
Stromer-Galley (2000) has therefore found that parties pursuing vote-maximisation strategies through 
centralised teams are often deeply wary of ceding control as interactive engagements can undermine 
electoral objectives. This suggests that parties with highly centralised organisational structures are less 
likely to view interaction favourably or seek to enact this form of tool compared with more 
decentralised parties.  
Less common to studies of digital, but prevalent elsewhere in scholarship on party behaviour, is the 
relevance of party heterogeneity. Whilst widely acknowledged that parties are stratarchical 
organisations (Carty, 2004) composed of factions and tendencies that inspire contestation, debate and 
power struggles within parties (Rose, 1964), hitherto limited attention has been paid to the presence 
and significance of different views of digital within single party organisations. It is therefore unclear 
whether elites within parties hold a consistent view of digital, and whether this affects behaviour. Here 
it is theorised that heterogeneity in regards to different views of digital affects outcomes. Where 
uniformly indifferent or negative views are held, little evidence of interaction is likely to be found. 
Where views are more divided, progress in implementing interactive tools is likely to be frustrated, 
especially where there is a balance of power between the actors concerned.  Finally, where views are 
united in favour of interaction, greater progress can be expected.  
Finally, resource is also cited as a key factor in explaining the uptake of digital tools. As Lilleker and 
9HGHO KDYH FODLPHG µ>Z@ithout resources, a sophisticated and innovative web presence is far more 
difficult¶  7KLV VXJJHVWV WKDW SDUWLHV ZLWK more resource may exhibit evidence of greater 
interactivity, and yet studies of UK parties suggest that the relationship here is not clear. This is 
because the BNP, a party with limited financial resource, demonstrate considerable interactivity 
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(Baxter, Marcella and Varfis, 2011; Lilleker and Jackson, 2010), suggesting that resource may be 
mediated by other factors. Questions of resource therefore require further study. 
These explanations suggest the importance of variations between parties, but within this article it is 
also argued that there are important differences within single organisations. A notable feature of the 
existing literature is the tendency to stuG\SDUWLHV¶FDPSDLJQLQJDFWLYLWLHV(Jensen, 2016; Lilleker and 
Jackson, 2010), and yet it is widely acknowledged that parties perform a range of functions (Sartori, 
2005). Parties can utilise digital for electioneering, policy-making, recruitment and to advance 
aggregation, participation and conflict management (Ibid.: 21-2). For this reason, this article structures 
its analysis by looking, first, at electoral campaigning EHIRUH VHFRQG H[DPLQLQJ SDUWLHV¶ LQWHUQDO
democratic governance. This division, whilst admittedly crude, allows a distinction to be drawn 
EHWZHHQ SDUWLHV¶ YLHZV DQG DSSOLFDWLRQ RI GLJLWDO LQ the context of short-term electoral imperatives, 
and contrastingly, to internal applications where SDUWLHV¶ IDFH LQFHQWLYHV WR HQJDJH PHPEHUV DQG
supporters in longer-term ways. This frame structures the analysis that follows and is used to explore 
the relative purchase and explanatory power of the different variables cited above.  
Case Studies 
To examine elite SDUW\DFWRUV¶perceptions and applications of digital two case studies of the Labour 
and Green Party in the UK are used. These two cases are selected as their different attributes allow the 
theories outlined above to be tested.  
In line with Römmele¶V hypothesis, these two parties have historically been defined by different 
organisational objectives. Whilst the Labour Party is a vote-seeking organisation focused on the 
pursuit of elected office, the Green Party has traditionally been thought of as focused on intra-party 
democracy, with significant emphasis placed on its internal democratic structure and the significance 
of members (Harmel and Janda, 1994). Whilst some scholars have highlighted the increasing 
acceptance of vote maximising practices within the central party office (Dennison, 2016), internal 
democracy remains an important objective (Wilks-Heeg, Blick and Crone, 2012). Recognising the 
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continued importance of this tradition, a distinction is drawn between these cases, and yet, 
contestation here is noted. 
Organisationally, the two parties also differ significantly in regards to structure, heterogeneity and 
resource. Founded in 1900 the Labour Party, in contrast to the Greens, has a sustained record of 
electoral success at national, local and European levels. Its present structure is highly centralised as, 
despite being formed as a mass membership party (Duverger, 1954), decreases in the size of party 
membership (to 552,000 members in 20171) and a series of reforms have led to central control 
(Faucher-King and Le Galès, 2010).2  In terms of heterogeneity, the party has a long history of 
factionalism, derived from ideological tensions (Finlayson, 2013) and competing views of party 
democracy, divisions that have become prominent under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. In 2016, 
the party declared an income of £49,840,000.00 (Electoral Commission, 2016a) and hence are able to 
invest considerably in central party staff (with 289 full time and 54 part time staff in London and 
regional offices (Ibid: 15)) and campaigning.  
In contrast, the Green Party of England and Wales is a far smaller organisation. Formed initially as 
People in the early 1970s, the party has a devolved power structure and minimal central infrastructure. 
Whilst, over time there has been investment in central party services and staff, the decentred ethos of 
the party has prevailed, meaning, for example, that the party lacks a centralised system for recording 
voter information. Culturally the party has less established factions than Labour, but recent increases 
in party membership (to 55,500 members) KDYH VHHQ JURZLQJ WHQVLRQV EHWZHHQ µWUDGLWLRQDO¶
supporters motivated by climate change and newer members who favour a broader left wing message. 
In addition, amongst elites some disquiet is evident over the degree of decentralisation, resulting in 
some calls for greater centralisation of infrastructure and strategy. In terms of resource, the party 
declared an income of £2,165,032.00, just 4 SHUFHQWRI/DERXU¶V7KLV WUDQVODWHV LQWo a far smaller 
                                                     
1
 It is important to acknowledge recent increases in membership within Labour and the Green Party. For more 
information, see: House of Commons Library (2017) Membership of UK Political Parties, London: Stationary 
Office.  
2
 This is not to deny the reforms conducted by Ed Miliband to democratise the party. For more see Goes E 
(2016) The Labour Party Under Ed Miliband: Trying But Failing to Renew Social Democracy. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
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staff, with 46.2 full-time equivalent posts, and less central party capacity (Electoral Commission, 
2016b: 20). 
In line with existing theory we may therefore H[SHFW WKDW /DERXU DQG WKH *UHHQ¶V ZRXOG H[KLELW
different digital adoption practices because they have different organisational imperatives, levels of 
centralisation, heterogeneity and resource. What is unclear, however, is whether expected correlations 
exist between these variables and the outcomes observed in each case. To examine these ideas 
interviews were used to identify HOLWHRIILFLDOV¶UDWLRQDOHIRUGLJLWDODGRSWLRQ, examining the degree to 
which the above variables featured in respondents¶ ideas. A content analysis of party documentation 
and digital tools was also undertaken to verify whether intentions were translated into reality. This 
DSSURDFK DOORZV WKH SDSHU WR PRYH EH\RQG µRIILFLDO VWRU\¶ DFFRXQWV .DW] DQG 0DLU, 1992) which 
capture parties¶IRUPDOO\stated objectives, to examine the thinking behind actions and the challenges 
encountered in translating ideas into practice. It also departs from the form of replicable coding 
frameworks deployed in studies to date (c.f. Stromer-Galley, 2000).  
In total, 12 interviews semi-structured occurred with senior party staff, consultants, board members 
and volunteers working directly with the national party (as opposed to elected politicians) between 
January and April 2017. Participants were asked a series of questions relating to parties¶ roles, their 
connections with citizens, their use of digital, and challenges experienced in the adoption of digital, 
focusing on practices between 2015 and 2017 (prior to the General Election). All interviews were 
transcribed and coded to identify key themes. Anonymous quotations, attributed to each party, are 
used in the analysis that follows to offer insight into the thinking of elite political actors (Vaccari, 
2010). An overview of interviewees is available in Appendix 1.  
3DUWLHV¶ Adoption of Digital  
Electoral Campaigning 
In the field of election campaigning, SDUWLHV¶DGRSWLRQRIGLJLWDOWRRls has been relatively uniform with 
data management and canvassing software (such as /DERXU¶V Contact Creator and WKH *UHHQ¶V 
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localised systems such as EARS or Nationbuilder), party websites, social media presence, online 
fundraising tools and digital apps used by both parties. In regards to interactivity, interviews in both 
parties revealed that whilst some variation in actual usage occurred, amongst elites interaction was not 
desired or pursued.  
Within Labour, interviewees described WKHLUGHVLUHWRXVHGLJLWDOWRµ>SXW@ our platform out there and 
invit[e] WKHP>WKHSXEOLF@WRDSSURYHLWRUQRW¶Interview 3). This strategy was described as µprobably 
PRUHDERXWSUHVHQWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQ¶WKDQLQYLWLQJWZR-way forms of connection (Interview 2). Indeed, 
one interviewee reflected: 
µ,I,¶PKRQHVW,GRQ¶WWKLQNZHDUH\HWDWWKHVWDJHZKHUHZHEHOLHYHWKDWGLJLWDOLV
going to connect with people in some sort of spectacular or revolutionary way. I 
WKLQNZKDWZH¶UHZRUNLQJWRwards is to make the party more accessible and use 
WHFKQRORJ\WRMXVWWHOOSHRSOHZKDWZH¶UHDERXW¶Interview 3). 
Engagements with the public were therefore aimed at communication, a trait readily apparent on the 
SDUW\¶V ZHEVLWH ZKLFK SULPDULO\ FRQWDLQHG news stories and policy positions as opposed to 
opportunities for interaction and discussion. Similarly, social media produced by the central party 
focused on advertising the leader¶s activities and policy positions, rather than soliciting more 
interactive engagements (akin to the findings of Jensen, 2016).3 
A similar rationale underpinned interactions between central party HQ and activists. Interviewees 
described how members and supporters were viewed DV DGYRFDWHV RI WKH SDUW\¶V SRVLWLRQ RU IRRW
soldiers collecting data for central party use and oversight. One digital consultant described the digital 
strategy DVGHILQHGE\µPRQH\PHVVDJHDQGPRELOLVDWLRQDQG«DQDWWHPSWWREXLOGDPovement and 
WRPRWLYDWHRXU VXSSRUWHUV¶ Interview 5). Digital tools were therefore seen as a way of stimulating 
engagement (either as voting or volunteering) and were not, of themselves, seen to facilitate a different 
form of interaction. Digital accordingly served as a tool µWRPDNHLWHDVLHUIRUSHRSOHWRGRZKDWWKH\
                                                     
3
 It is worth re-iterating that interest here is in centrally derived digital tools, not those produced independently 
by activists that have proved a key feature of recent electoral campaigns (Gibson, 2015). 
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do, VRWKDWORFDOSDUWLHVGRQ¶WKDYHWRVRUWRIVWDUWEDWWOLQJDURXQGZLWKspreadsheets and moving data 
IURPRQHV\VWHPLQWRDQRWKHU¶ (Interview 3). Digital hence enabled members to have:  
µ«more time actually going out and speaking to people and making a difference 
in the community rather than getting tied up on things that take longer than they 
VKRXOG EHFDXVH ZH¶UH NLQG RI ILJKWLQJ D OLWWOH ELW DJDLQVW ROG WHFKQRORJ\ WKDW
PD\EHKDVQ¶WNHSWSDFHDVPXFKDVLWPLJKWKDYHGRQH¶Interview 1). 
This rationale was exemplified in practices such as webinars designed to up-skill DFWLYLVWV¶
campaigning skills and new tools, such as Promote - which one interviewee described as sitting 
µEHWZHHQ )DFHERRN DGYHrtising and our own data systems, that will make it easier for local party 
JURXSV WR UXQ ORFDO DGYHUWLVLQJ LQFOXGLQJ $% WHVWLQJ RI PHVVDJH¶ Interview 6). Similarly, it 
underpinned social media content designed to be shared by supporters. Videos, memes and news 
stories produced by the FHQWUDOSDUW\¶VGLJLWDOFRQVXOWDQWV%OXH State Digital, No date) were designed 
to disseminate information via sharing, rather than invite direct engagement between the party and 
activists or the public. 
In understanding LaERXU¶VDSSURDFKWRGLJLWDODGRSWLRQLWDSSHDUVLQOLQHZLWKRömmele¶VWKHRU\, that 
adoption practices are KHDYLO\FRQGLWLRQHGE\SDUW\PRWLYDWLRQ/DERXU¶VIRFXVRQvote-maximisation 
inspired a top-down dissemination strategy, with central party staff using digital to complement 
existing offline activities rather than facilitating new forms of interaction. Amongst interviewees this 
perspective was uniformly advanced, demonstrating a high degree of consensus and an accordingly 
lack of internal contestation about approach. Whilst some interviewees did voice interest in interactive 
tools ± VXFKDV0RPHQWXP¶VFDUSRRODSSDQGGLJLWDOSKRQHEDQN ± these were viewed with caution 
because of a desire not to jeopardise primary electoral aims. One interviewee therefore noted, µ>V@o 
WKDWVRXQGVOLNHDFRROWRRO«EXWWKHQ,ZDVORRNLQJDWLWDQGLWUDLVHVORDGVRITXHVWLRQV«WKHSUREOHP
from our perspective, the Labour Party perspective, LV KRZ GR \RX PDQDJH WKH ULVN DURXQG WKDW"¶
(Interview 1). This suggests that experimentation with interactive digital tools is inhibited by central 
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staff concerns about their implications, leading them to concentrate on methods and styles of 
engagement proven to deliver electoral success without unnecessary risk.  
Turning to the Green Party, interviews revealed marked similarities with the ideas and practices of 
Labour elites, despite theorised differences in party objectives. Akin to Labour, Green elites outlined a 
desire to use digital to DPSOLI\ µWKH YDOXH RI ZKDW [representatives are] GRLQJ¶ E\ LQIRUPLQJ ERWK
PHPEHUVDQGYRWHUVDOORZLQJWKHQDWLRQDOSDUW\WRIRFXVRQµIRUPXODWLQJLGHDVDQGSUHVHQW>LQJ@ it to 
WKH SXEOLF¶ DQG µEURDGFDVWLQJ¶ LQ D ZD\ QRW SUHYLRXVO\ SRVVLEOH ,QWHUYLHZ   This objective was 
VWURQJO\FRQQHFWHGWRWKHSDUW\¶VGLIILFXOW\LQDFFHVVLQJWUDGLWLRQDOPHGLDFKDQQHOV and an according 
desire to communicate directly with citizens (Casero-Ripolles, Feenstra and Tormey, 2016; Römmele, 
2003: 9), but notably focus was placed on presenting information rather than pursuing interaction. 
Similar to Labour, for central party staff digital also facilitated more efficient engagements with 
PHPEHUV:LWKLQ WKHFHQWUDOSDUW\PHPEHUVZHUHGHVFULEHGDV µRXUIRRW VROGLHUV¶ ,QWHUYLHZ and 
ZHUH VHHQ DV DGYRFDWHV IRU WKH SDUW\¶V PHVVDJH (OLWHV WKHUHIRUH IRFXVHG RQ WU\LQJ WR µLQFUHDVH WKH
numbers or proportion of members who are actually willing to be engaged in some general activity 
WKDW
VJRLQJWRVXSSRUWRXUHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQ¶,QWHUYiew 7), rather than facilitating more interaction. 
7KHVHGLJLWDOFDPSDLJQLQJSUDFWLFHVDUHH[HPSOLILHGRQWKHQDWLRQDOSDUW\¶VZHEVLWHZKLFKSURPRWHV
information, recruits volunteers and mobilizes members, with scant opportunity for interaction. They 
were also evident in examples of citizen-initiated digital content. IQLWLDWLYHVVXFKDVµ5HDVRQVWR9RWH
*UHHQ¶ DQ DSS WKDW DOORZHG LQGLYLGXDOV WR VHOHFW policies that most inspired them to produce a 
VKDUHDEOH JUDSKLF RQ VRFLDO PHGLD DQG WKH µ*UHHQ 3DUW\ 0HPH %XLOGHU¶ ZKLFK DOORZHG SHRSOH WR
upload an image and create memes using the official Green Party logos and fonts) were described in 
terms of their capacity to µleverag[e] social media to spread messages about [the] Green Party and get 
Green Party votes, RUJHWSHRSOHZKRDUHQ
W*UHHQ3DUW\YRWHUVWRWDNHLQWHUHVW¶(Interview 10). Vote-
PD[LPLVLQJ UDWLRQDOH WKHUHIRUH XQGHUSLQQHG PXFK RI WKH SDUW\¶V DFWLYLW\, colouring the ideas and 
practices not just of elites, but of others within the party hierarchy. 
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When discussing party practices elite interviewees did, however, acknowledge that alternative 
practices could be found within the party. Interviewees recounted a tendency for significant sections 
of the party to: 
µWKLQN ZHOO ZH
OO VRUW RI PDNH D ELW RI D Jesture of running election 
campaigns, but we're not really going to put in the work that's required, and 
what we're going to do instead is run a stall all about TTIP [Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership] or have an interesting public meeting 
about pollution, or something you know, that feels like you're engaging in 
JUHHQSROLWLFV¶,QWHUYLHZ 
This alternative philosophy was seen to drive a different style of interaction between some local 
parties, their members and the wider public. Digital campaigning in this vein focused not on 
dissemination, but rather on µFRQVXOWLQJ ZLWK FRPPXQLW\ FDPSDLJQV«DQG IRUPXODWLQJ LQWHUHVWLQJ
SROLF\LGHDV¶,QWHUYLHZ via Facebook groups and online discussion. Although not promoted by the 
central party office, elites acknowledged that the decentralised party structure and a lack of central 
control allowed local parties to utilise digital tools in more interactive ways. 
In regards to Römmele¶V WKHRU\ this suggests that parties can exhibit competing ideas about their 
primary goals which, when mediated by organisational factors such as a lack of central control and 
decentralised structure, result in different practices as well as ideas. $V VXFKZLWKLQ WKH *UHHQ¶V LW
appears that vote-maximising objectives dominate elite ideas and practices, but that party structures 
can allow more interactive practices to emerge. Notably, in neither case was resource cited as a 
pertinent concern. 
Internal Governance 
The second dimension of party activities considered here refers to the way in which parties are 
governed, and the degree to which the views of the public, party members and/or supporters, as 
opposed to the ideas of elites, guide party actions. Within both parties digital underpins governance: it 
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is central to membership management platforms such as Membersnet and Civi CRM, it is used to 
facilitate discussion on internal member forums, and it enables other communications, with email 
routinely used to disseminate messages, solicit participation or funds and to organize activity both 
horizontally and vertically within party hierarchies (Nielsen, 2010). Within these cases digital is used 
primarily to facilitate the representation of party members as opposed to the public. Indeed, 
interviewees within Labour stated:  
µ, think at the moment, there's not really any real mechanisms for members 
of the public to get involved aside from if they want to join as members. The 
closest you've got is interacting with us on Facebook, or other social media 
channels. But to what extent that's a meaningful relationship I'm not quite 
VXUH¶Interview 2). 
Recognising this focus, interactive digital tools were viewed positively by both parties, but in each 
case there was evidence of a disjuncture between attitudes and practices.  
Within Labour, contrary to expectations, interviews revealed consistent interest in using digital to 
facilitate interaction. However, in practice, significant differences between desires and actions 
emerged. Highlighting the creation of a Digital Transformation Team, many interviewees reflected on 
WKHSDUW\¶VGHVLUH µto develop a far richer and deeper two-ZD\UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKPHPEHUV¶ :DWVRQ
2015). This involved DQDPELWLRQWRµJLYHWKHWHQVRIWKRXVDQGRIQHZPHPEHUVZKR¶YHMRLQHGVLQFH
the election a real say over how the party is run¶,ELG). The Team¶s activities to date have involved 
the creation of a MyLabour app which interviewees described as having the potential to create µKXJH
opportunities for a totally different more participative way¶RIRUJDQLVLQJPHPEHUVYLDFRPPXQLWLHVRI
interest (as opposed to geography) (Interview 4).  
Yet, whilst the enthusiasm for interaction and new forms of digital organisation was clear, in practice 
these tools have failed to materialise. The MyLabour app, for example, only currently enables 
members to receive news and information and access a digital membership card, perpetuating 
information dissemination rather than interaction. Elsewhere high profile attempts to solicit opinion 
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VXFK DV WKH SDUW\¶V GHFLVLRn to ask the public what questions Jeremy Corbyn should ask at Prime 
0LQLVWHUV4XHVWLRQVDQGWRJDWKHUPHPEHUV¶YLHZVRQPLOLWDU\DFWLRQLQ6\ULDLQYLDHPDLO, have 
not enabled two-way debate or decision making, but rather new avenues for expression.  
The possible explanations for this disjuncture are manifold. At one level, questions of central control 
appear to be playing a role. For some interviewees there was open trepidation about the implications 
of implementing such tools because of concerns about:   
µDVNLQJ IRU OLNH RSLQLRQV DOO WKH WLPH RQ VWXII EHFDXVH \RX FRXOG JHW RSLQLRQV
which actually you feel don't represent the people who you want to be 
UHSUHVHQWLQJZKR\RXZHUHIRXQGHGWRUHSUHVHQW¶,QWHUYLHZ 
There appeared unwillingness amongst some to cede control to an unpredictable constituency because 
of possible unforeseen implications (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016). Yet, for other interviewees 
more Machiavellian forces were at play. Indeed, one interviewee argued that there were some people 
in the Labour Party who enjoy the fact that there are µdigitally native people who are unable to engage 
with civic institutions like thH /DERXU 3DUW\¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  7KLV VXJJHVWV QRW FDXWLRQ RYHU
implications, but the existence of a more fundamental schism over the degree to which the party 
should be engaging with members. 
Evidence of heterogeneous views also emerged regarding the degree to which interactivity should be 
pursued. To give one example, interviewees RIIHUHGGLIIHUHQWYLHZVRIWKHSDUW\¶VSRVLWLRQLQUHODWLRQ
to Pol.is ± a tool adopted in Europe and elsewhere to facilitate internal party debate. Whilst some 
interviewees SURFODLPHGDQLQWHQWLRQWRXVH3ROLVDWWKHSDUW\¶VFRQIHUHQFHWRGHYHORSYLa the 
membership, a policy on universal basic income - ZLWKDYLHZWRJHWWLQJµWKHPHPEHUVKLSWRZULWHWKH
QH[W JHQHUDO HOHFWLRQ PDQLIHVWR¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  ± RWKHU ILJXUHV GHVFULEHG KRZ µZH PLJKW EH WU\LQJ
Pol.is at a very small scale as a follow on from reDO ZRUOG HYHQWV LQ WKH QH[W FRXSOH RI PRQWKV¶
(Interview 6). This suggests the presence of different levels of commitment towards interactive 
innovations, which, in this case, were notably held by actors with similar levels of power. This 
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resulted in µgenuine disagreements [over] whether the next manifesto should be written by party 
PHPEHUV¶,QWHUYLHZ that frustrated progress.  
4XHVWLRQV RI UHVRXUFH DOVR DSSHDUHG WR SOD\ D UROH LQ DFFRXQWLQJ IRU /DERXU¶V EHKDYLRXU 2QH
interviewee argued that:  
µWKHre is the nervousness that basically, if you ask people what they think about 
DQ\WKLQJWKHQLW¶VQRWXQUHDVRQDEOHRIWKHPWRH[SHFWDUHSO\$QGWKHUH¶VJRWWR
EH D KXPDQ WKDW GRHV WKDW«'LJLWDO HQDEOHV D PLOOLRQ SHRSOH WR JHW LQ WRXFK
whereas before it woXOGRQO\KDYHEHHQD WKRXVDQG7KHUH¶VKRZPXFKGR\RX
RSHQ DQ\ RI WKRVH IORRGJDWHV EHFDXVH LI ZH FDQ¶W GHDO ZLWK LW LW¶V SUHWW\ IDNH
LQYLWLQJWKRVHFRPPHQWVDQGWKHQQRWUHVSRQGLQJ¶,QWHUYLHZ 
Whilst Labour possesses greater resource than the Greens it therefore appears that material concerns 
around WKHSDUW\¶Vcapacity for organisational responsiveness inhibit the enactment of interactive tools.  
/DERXU¶V SRVLWLRQ WRZDUGV GLJLWDO LQWHUDFWLRQ Ls therefore complex. The party appear far more 
receptive to these ideas for internal governance as opposed to campaigning, suggesting that different 
objectives are paramount in each realm. However, organisational traits, including a desire for central 
control, internal contestation and resource appear to have played a role in frustrating the enactment of 
this idea.  
Turning to the Greens, a similar disjuncture between desires and practices is evident, but in this case 
one obstacle, resource, appears to have frustrated desires. Interviews revealed a consistent desire to: 
µGRWKLQJVTXLWHGLIIHUHQWO\DERXWWU\LQJWRHQJDJHPRUHSHRSOHLQSROLWLFV
it's not just we're going to ask you a few questions, to better know how to 
sway you at the next election, its you're going to be part of our power and 
VWXII¶,QWHUYLew 7).  
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µ, DOVR WKLQN WKDW LI ZH GR LW SURSHUO\ LW FDQ DFWXDOO\ EH D JHQXLQH
conversation with people and so we can do reJXODUVXUYH\VZHFDQXVHLW«
so people can feel like they can actually contribute to the way the party is 
RSHUDWLQJ¶,QWHUYLHZ 
This suggests a clear ambition for more interactive engagement, and reflects failures in the SDUW\¶V
current representative structures. Discussing the purpose of the party and its representative goals, 
interviewees remarked on the importance of internal democracy, particularly emphasising that 
µPHPEHUV DUH VRYHUHLJQ LQ WKH *UHHQ 3DUW\¶ DQG WKDW SROLF\ LV GHWHUPLQHG LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK
democratic procedures (Interview 7). However, within the organisation, the desire for interactive 
connections is often not fulfilled. One interviewee noted that:  
µ[t]here's been some attempts through our members' website to broaden 
HQJDJHPHQW EXW WKH WRROV DUH UHDOO\ SULPLWLYH DQG LW MXVW GRHVQ
W ZRUN¶
(Interview 7).  
Elsewhere the SDUW\¶VPHPEHUV¶DUHDwas described as:  
µD total mess. No one really understands the purpose or the function and it's 
just grown into this massive beast that no one can control. It's also quite a 
dark place, in a way, if you go on the forum, it's you know, the language is 
horrible, it's very much echoing the Twitter kind of, the same problems 
7ZLWWHUKDV¶,QWHUYLHZ 
Others argued WKDWµWKHV\VWHPMXVWGRHVQ
WSURYLGHDQLFHSODFHWREHDEOHHYHQDSURGXFWLYHSODFHWR
KDYHWKHVHVRUWVRIGLVFXVVLRQV«>E@RWKWRIHHGLQWRZKDWWKHSDUW\
VSROLF\ultimately is, because they 
FDQ GHFLGH LW DQG DOVR MXVW WR VKDSH ZKDW ZH
UH WDONLQJ DERXW¶ Interview 7). Interactions with 
members were therefore commonly defined by e-mail, with respondents noting µZH VHQG WKHP
[members] email updates, we're connected ZLWK WKHP RQ VRFLDO PHGLD¶ DQG WKH SDUW\ XVHV WH[W
messages, but for the most part these connections arHGHVLJQHGWRGLVVHPLQDWHLQIRUPDWLRQµDERXWKRZ
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WKH\FDQJHW LQYROYHG«DERXWZKDW WKHLUHOHFWHGPHPEHUVDQGSHRSOH WKDW WKH\
YHHOHFWHG LQWHUQDOO\
are doing¶, not more interactive representative connections (Interview 9). 
These findings suggest a divide between the Green PDUW\¶VREMHFWLYHVDQGWKHLUDFWXDOEHKDYLRXUbut 
unlike Labour, where a range of barriers were cited, here material constraints are of primary concern. 
Indeed, interviewees lamented a lack of tangible resource, noting that the party already has an 
H[SHQVLYHµVKRSSLQJOLVWRIWKLQJVZH
GOLNHWREHDEOHWRKDYHWKDWPRVWSDUWLHVZRXOGWKLQNDUHMXVW
EDVLF\RXNQRZ¶,QWHUYLHZGHVLUHV that curtailed their capacity to trial more interactive tools. As 
VXFK LQQRYDWLRQ ZDV GHSHQGHQW RQ LGHQWLI\LQJ YROXQWHHUV µZLWK WLPH WR SXW LQWR LW DV ZHOO DV DQ\
PRQH\WRSXWLQWRSURMHFWV¶,QWHUYLHZDVWUDWHJ\ that whilst amenable to short term initiatives, is 
frustrated when seeking to address long-term, complex organisational reforms. For the Greens, 
therefore, a desire to enable greater interactivity was frustrated by resource.  
Discussion 
Digital technology is integral to the many functions that parties perform, but hitherto there have been 
few indications that party elites are interested in using this tool to facilitate more interactive 
engagements with citizens. Echoing signs that citizens themselves have begun to innovate on this 
front, these cases provide evidence of elite interest in interactivity, but also reveal important 
differences between and within parties that conform and depart from expected theory on why this has 
occurred.  
First, these cases suggest that parties¶ motivation is a significant influence on the uptake of interactive 
digital tools, however, predicted differences between the parties were not found. Whilst, as expected, 
Labour showed little interest in interaction for electoral campaigning, Green Party elites did not favour 
interactivity in this realm, but outlined how others within the party pursued such ideas. These findings 
suggest that Green Party elites have adopted vote-maximising imperatives (Dennison, 2016), but they 
also indicate that party objectives are not singular and that, facilitated by a decentralised structure, 
more interactive practices can emerge. In developing this point, it seems that organisational structure 
is not separate to questions of motivation, but rather helps to explain variations in this realm. 
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5RPPHOOH¶V WKHRU\ FDQ WKHUHIRUH EH XVHIXOO\ DSSHQGHG E\ UHFRJQLVLQJ WKH LQWHUDFWLRQV EHWZHHQ
motivation and party structure, with these cases suggesting that parties with decentred structures and a 
history of local autonomy are more likely to contain elites tolerant of local interactive innovations than 
those with centralised structures.   
In addition, these cases revealed unexpected differences between parties¶ campaigning and governing 
functions, with Labour and the Greens showing receptivity to interaction. However, these ideas were 
not translated into practice. In explaining such outcomes these cases reveal the significance of other 
variables VXJJHVWLQJ KRZ LQ /DERXU¶V FDVH concerns over ceding control, internal contestation and 
resource inhibited progress, whereas LQ WKH *UHHQ¶V D ODFN RI UHVRXUFH was paramount. Adapting 
Römmele¶V WKHRU\ LW LV WKHUHIRUH Lmportant to recognise that parties do not always possess uniform 
objectives but can hold and pursue different ideas both throughout a party hierarchy and across 
functional terrain. From these cases it appears that elites that have central control, are united and well 
resourced are more likely to to realise their objectives (whether interactive or not) than those which sit 
within decentralised structures, exhibit contestation and possess limited resource, and yet, in these 
latter cases (as with the Greens) local innovation is expected to be more readily found.  
These studies have therefore suggested that motivation is the dominant concern, arguing that whilst 
structure, heterogeneity and resource can frustrate the realisation of objectives, they are not alone able 
to explain attitudes or behaviour around the uptake of digital tools. This supports previous studies 
(Marcinkowski and Metag, 2014) and suggests the value of developing hybrid and contextually 
conscious explanations of party behaviour that recognise how motivations vary and are mediated by 
organisational traits. Such analysis would allow an exploration of, for example, the point at which 
differences in the degree of centralised power allow local innovations to emerge (and be tolerated). Or 
how variations in the degree of consensus over party objectives work to frustrate or promote the 
pursuit of favoured ideas. These cases offer some indication of expected behaviour here, but further 
longitudinal, comparative analysis is required to map how YDULDWLRQV LQSDUWLHV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQDO WUDLWV
inform elite perceptions and enactment of digital tools, tracing developments over time to map how 
shifts in organisation affect observed trends.  
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In pursuing such analysis this article has also demonstrated the need to recognise important 
differences across party functions DQGEHWZHHQSDUWLHV¶GHVLUHVDQGDFWLRQVUnlike existing studies of 
interactivity that have tended to focus on party campaigning (Jensen, 2016; Lilleker and Jackson, 
2010), this article examined SDUWLHV¶ FDPSDLJQLQJ DFWLYLWLHV DQG LQWHUQDO JRYHUQDQFH to demonstrate 
the presence of very different attitudes within single parties. It showed evidence of greater interest in 
digital interaction when looking at longer-term governing interactions with members and supporters, 
as opposed to short-term campaign-focused engagements. Further study is required to explore the 
replication of this trend, particularly looking at the significance of ideology. As both these cases are 
located on the Left of the ideological spectrum it may be expected that they would display a greater 
interest in intra-party democracy than Right-wing organisations (Bennett et al, 2017). As such it is 
important to investigate the extent to which such functional differences are evident in other party 
contexts to appreciate the significance of this work.   
In addition, this study has also shown the value of distinguishing between attitudes and practice. 
:KLOVWPDQ\SUHYLRXV VWXGLHVKDYH FRGHGSDUWLHV¶RXWSXWVDQGDFWLYLWLHV WRPDNHFODLPV DERXW WKHLU
receptivity to digital interaction, this study has shown that important factors can inhibit or inform 
SDUWLHV¶ DGRSWLRQ RI Lnteractive digital tools. By recognising the significance of attitudinal and/or 
material barriers this article has revealed new insights of pertinence for those seeking to promote 
interactive digital tools (a point discussed further below).   
Conclusion 
This article has explored digital adoption practices in the Labour and Green Party to examine elite 
perceptions and applications of interactive digital tools. In contrast to existing studies that have 
diagnosed evidence of normalization in adoption practices, this study has shown evidence of an 
interest amongst elites in interactivity. It has also revealed important variations across party functions 
and between stated desires and practices, findings that inform the conclusion that elite interest is often 
inconsistent and is frequently unrealised. The degree to which this signals a new development is 
unclear as longitudinal analysis is not available to compare attitudes over time, what is evident is that 
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VLPSOH FDWHJRULVDWLRQV RI SDUWLHV¶ EHKDYLRXU DV either advancing µQRUPDOL]DWLRQ¶ RU µHTXDOL]DWLRQ¶
alone fail to capture the diversity of ways in which parties view and engage with digital tools.  
In addition, this article has argued that existing theories require adaptation. Building on Römmele¶V
DUJXPHQW WKDWSDUWLHV¶SULPDU\REMHFWLYHFRQGLWLRQV WKHXSWDNHRI LQWHUDFWLYH WRROV, this analysis has 
shown that parties can possess multiple objectives and that variations in party organisation, 
heteroenity and resource can mediate the enactment of different ideas. Furthermore, it has shown 
LPSRUWDQW YDULDWLRQV DFURVV SDUWLHV¶ IXQFWLRQV and between attitudes and outputs that result in 
differences within single parties. Recognising the diversity of factors informing party behaviour this 
article calls for longitudinal, comparative analysis that maps attitudes and practices in parties within 
the UK and beyond to discern trends emerging from the confluence of different organisational traits, 
elite perceptions and practices.  
For those interested in promoting interactive digital tools, this study also shows where conditions are 
most favourable for the promotion of these tools. Whilst in the context of electoral campaigning elites 
appear uninterested in these ideas, this study has shown that advocates are more likely to receive a 
favourable audience when looking at internal party governance, especially when offering solutions to 
perceived barriers to reform. Whether focusing on developing consensus over the value of interactive 
engagement or developing strategies for those with less material resource, it appears that identifying 
and responding to barriers is key. Recognising the capricious nature of the party environment, there 
may accordingly be virtue in developing tools capable of facilitating different forms of interaction, 
PDUU\LQJ SDUWLHV¶ GHVLUH IRU LQIRUPDWLRQ GLVVHPLQDWLRQ LQ RQH functional realm with an interest in 
interaction for member engagement in another. Through such means those promoting interactive 
digital tools may see a greater uptake of their ideas. 
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